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ABSTRACT
The main argument of this paper is, namely, the need for greater emphasis on disclosure 
requirements and measures – particularly within the securities markets. This argument is justified 
on the basis of lessons which have been drawn from the recent Financial Crises, one of which is the 
inability of bank capital requirements on their own to address funding and liquidity problems. The 
engagement of market participants in the corporate reporting process, a process which would 
consequently enhance market discipline, constitutes a fundamental means whereby greater 
measures aimed at facilitating prudential supervision could be extended to the securities markets. 
Auditors, in playing  a vital role in financial reporting, as tools of corporate governance, contribute 
to the disclosure process and towards engaging market participants in the process. This paper will 
however consider other means whereby transparency and disclosure of financial information within 
the securities markets could be enhanced, and also the need to accord greater priority to prudential 
supervision within the securities markets. 
Furthermore, the paper draws attention to the need to focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II, namely, market 
discipline. It illustrates how through Pillar 3, market participants like credit agencies can determine 
the levels of capital retained by banks – hence their potential to rectify or exacerbate pro cyclical 
effects resulting from Pillars 1 and 2. The challenges encountered by Pillars 1 and 2 in addressing
credit risk is reflected by problems identified with pro cyclicality, which are attributed to banks’ 
extremely sensitive internal credit risk models, and the level of capital buffers which should be 
retained under Pillar Two. Such issues justify the need to give greater prominence to Pillar 3. 
As a result of the influence and potential of market participants in determining capital levels, such 
market participants are able to assist regulators in managing more effectively, the impact of 
systemic risks which occur when lending criteria is tightened owing to Basel II's procyclical effects. 
Regulators are able to respond and to manage with greater efficiency, systemic risks to the financial 
system during periods when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend. This being 
particularly the case when such firms decide to cut back on lending activities, and the decisions of 
such firms cannot be justified in situations where such firms’ credit risk models are extremely 
sensitive – hence the level of capital being retained is actually much higher than minimum 
regulatory Basel capital requirements.
In elaborating on Basel II's pro cyclical effects, the gaps which exist with internal credit risk model 
measurements will be considered. Gaps which exist with Basel II's risk measurements, along with 
the increased prominence and importance of liquidity risks - as revealed by the recent financial 
crisis, and proposals which have been put forward to mitigate Basel II's procyclical effects will also 
be addressed.
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supervision; liquidity; capital; maturity mismatches; regulation
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Introduction
Each pillar within Basel II was intended to serve as a complement to the other and consequently, 
Pillar 3 disclosure requirements on their own, would not be sufficient to address issues relating to 
prudential supervision. However, even though Pillar Three is intended to serve as a complement to 
other pillars, the inability of bank capital on its own  to address funding and liquidity problems 
constitutes a focal theme throughout this paper. The ECB highlights the fact that even though 
“added disclosures for large counter parties and those that exceed certain thresholds would be useful 
in order to enable market participants to better assess their counter party risk and the potential for 
systemic spill over effects, that no disclosure requirements currently exist within the IASB 
accounting standards with respect to the main counterparts for derivative transactions.”2
The rectification of such a gap, namely the introduction of disclosure requirements with respect to 
the main counterparts of derivative transactions, would facilitate greater engagement of market 
participants in the standard setting process – hence promoting better corporate governance. 
Furthermore, such an engagement is crucial to the success of market based regulation – however, 
state intervention still finds a role in regulation. Within the context of the importance of state 
intervention in acting promptly to prevent the failure of “too interconnected” or “too big too fail” 
institutions, the impact of systemic risk will be illustrated later on in this paper.
The regulatory developments which took place or have taken place before, during and after the 
introduction of directives such as the Post BCCI Directive, Consolidated Banking Directive and the 
Capital Requirements Directive, not only highlight a focus on capital adequacy requirements as a 
foundation of prudential supervision, but also indicate a shift from the focus on banking to 
principally include investment activities. However, the recent crisis has highlighted the contribution 
of  liquidity risks in fuelling the problems which arose from the crisis – and the inability of capital 
adequacy requirements on their own to address such problems. 
In evaluating the progress and developments which have taken place since the Post BCCI Directive 
was introduced, to highlight the emphasis and focus which have been placed on capital adequacy 
requirements (through a consideration of these directives), and to explain why disclosure, 
transparency and prudential regulation within the securities markets have become so important, this 
paper will commence with a preliminary section which will consider directives which were 
introduced and have been introduced pre and post the Post BCCI Directive. In so doing it will 
highlight developments leading up to the introduction of the Post BCCI Directive, primary reasons 
for introducing the Post BCCI Directive, aims and objectives of the Post BCCI Directive and what 
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2 ‘Credit Defaults Swaps and Counter Party Risk’ ECB August 2009 at page 29
the Directive achieved. In considering directives introduced after the post BCCI directive - with 
particular reference to the Consolidated Banking Directive (Directive 2000/12/EC), and the Capital 
Requirements Directives (2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC), their aims and achievements will be 
discussed. The 2006/48/EC will constitute the focal point for purposes of comparative analysis 
(with the Post BCCI Directive) under this preliminary section.
Section two will then proceed to consider the contribution of the insurance and investment sectors 
to financial stability and to systemic risks, as well as how such risks could be managed effectively. 
The recent Crisis has also highlighted the fact that regulators underestimated the role played by non 
bank institutions in contributing to systemic risks. The European Commission attributed a lack of 
transparency within the securities markets to the fact that many securities were traded “over the 
counter” (OTC).3 Further it stated that derivative traders and other market participants as well as 
authorities and supervisors were not aware of the derivative trading activities which were taking 
place and how “a complex web of mutual dependence between market operators was being created, 
how to disentangle such interdependent market, and how to manage markets in cases which 
involved defaults and non payments by major derivative participants.”4 The collapse of Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers was attributed to factors such as defaults on sub prime mortgages and 
their exposure - this having been facilitated by collateralised debt obligations (CDOs).5 It is also 
contended that this consequently resulted in “mistrust amongst market participants about their 
individual and reciprocal capacity to pay, lack of lending to those who participated in derivatives 
trading, and lack of money for the derivatives market.”6 This section will therefore consider the 
importance and contribution on the insurance and investment sectors to systemic risks.
Section three will highlight developments which have taken place, and progress which has been 
achieved – particularly since the onset of the recent Financial Crisis. This amongst other 
achievements, include proposals for the establishment of an improved European Supervisory 
Framework, how Basel II has responded to criticisms relating to the pro cyclical effects generated 
by its overly sensitive internal credit risk models, and to the fact that capital requirements on their 
own, are not sufficient to counter problems arising from liquidity risks and maturity mismatches.
Section four will consider other recommendations and proposals which have been put forward as  
means of mitigating pro cyclical effects. The ensuing section (section five) will then elaborate on 
the role of market participants in assisting supervisory authorities in better management of systemic 
risk and other supervisory functions. This will then lead to section six which considers the link 
between prudential regulation and financial reporting, the importance of financial disclosure, 
reasons attributed to the need to extend the scope of present directives and a discussion on Credit 
Default Swaps (CDSs) and Counter Party Risk. A conclusion will then be drawn after having 
considered all these topics. Amongst other findings, this section will also highlight areas in which 
efforts and further research will still be required.
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I. Developments leading up to and incorporating the introduction of the Capital 
Requirements Directive
The Consolidated Banking Directive (Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20 March 2000) relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions consists of seven banking directives (along with their amending directives) which were 
replaced by the Commission to derive a single directive (the Consolidated Banking Directive).7 The 
seven directives are as follows:
- 73/183/EEC of 28 June 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment 
and freedom to provide services in respect of self-employed activities of banks and other 
financial institutions
- First Banking Directive
- Banking Supervision Directive
- Second Banking Directive
- Own Funds Directive
- Solvency Ratio Directive
- Large Exposures Directive
The purpose of such a codification was aimed at enhancing clarity and transparency of EU 
legislation.8
Paragraph 1 of the Preamble to the Directive reads:
Council Directive 73/183/EEC of 28 June 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services in respect of self-employed activities of banks and other financial institutions, first Council 
Directive (77/780/EEC) of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, Council Directive 89/299/EEC of 17 April 
1989 on the own funds of credit institutions, second Council Directive 89/646/ EEC of 15 December 1989 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions, Council Directive 89/647/EEC of 18 December 1989 on a solvency ratio for credit institutions, 
Council Directive 92/30/EEC of 6 April 1992 on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis, and 
Council Directive 92/121/EEC of 21 December 1992 on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit 
institutions have been frequently and substantially amended. For reasons of clarity and rationality, the said Directives 
therefore, should be codified and combined in a single text.
The Revised Framework for the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards – known as Basel II, was transposed by the Capital Requirements Directive – which 
comprises the 2006/48/EC Directive9 and the 2006/49/EC Directive.10 Such an implementation 
resulted in amendments to the Consolidated Banking Directive. The 2006/48/EC Directive 
replicates the codified consolidated Banking Directive. 
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Directive 95/26/EC (the "post BCCI" Directive) 
Aim of the Directive
As well as the reinforcement of prudential supervision, the Directive is aimed at protecting clients 
of financial undertakings.11 As illustrated by the BCCI case, “effective prudential supervision was 
handicapped by lack of information, an opaque conglomerate structure, and the difficulty 
encountered by various regulatory and other official bodies in exchanging information and 
cooperating satisfactorily, when the group ran into difficulties.”12
Furthermore, the role of an auditor in achieving the aims of the Directive is highlighted under 
paragraph 15 of the preamble to the Directive which states that:
„Whereas, for the purpose of strengthening the prudential supervision of financial undertakings and 
protection of clients of financial undertakings, it should be stipulated that an auditor must have a 
duty to report promptly to the competent authorities, wherever, as provided for by this Directive, he 
becomes aware, while carrying out his tasks, of certain facts which are liable to have a serious 
effect on the financial situation or the administrative and accounting organization of a financial 
undertaking“
Scope of the Directive
The Post BCCI Directive is considered to have “considerably widened the scope of information 
exchange with other official bodies (within the EU) who are not responsible for prudential 
supervision”.13 Such bodies include “bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of financial 
undertakings, authorities responsible for overseeing auditors, independent actuaries and their 
governing bodies, bodies responsible for the detection and investigation of breaches of company 
law, central banks and monetary authorities, public authorities responsible for payment systems, and 
bodies responsible for clearing or settlement services.”14
The scope covered by the Directive 95/26/EC (the "post BCCI" Directive) is also highlighted under 
Article 1 of the Directive. It extends to credit institutions, insurance undertakings, life assurance 
undertakings, investment firms and undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities.
Article 1 states that
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13 ibid
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Wherever the term 'financial undertaking' is used in this Directive, it shall be replaced by:
 'credit institution' where this Directive amends Directives 77/780/EEC and 89/646/EEC;
 'insurance undertaking' where this Directive amends Directives 73/239/EEC and 92/49/EEC, and 
'life assurance undertaking' where this Directive amends Directives 79/267/EEC and 92/96/EEC;
 'investment firm' where this Directive amends Directive 93/22/EEC;
 'undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (Ucits) or an undertaking 
contributing towards its business activity' where this Directive amends Directive 85/611/EEC.
The Post BCCI Directive amended Directive 77/780/EEC and Directive 89/646/EEC.15
Directive 2006/49/EC
The objectives of the Directive are highlighted under paragraph 5 to the Preamble:
„Since the objectives of this Directive, namely the establishment of the capital adequacy 
requirements applying to investment firms and credit institutions, the rules for their calculation and 
the rules for their prudential supervision, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and 
can therefore, by reason of the scale and the effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, 
as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its 
objectives.”
In drawing attention to the weaknesses of Directive 2004/39/EC16, Directive 2006/49/EC highlights 
the importance of established common standards being in place.  According to paragraphs 2 and 3 
of the Preamble:
(2) One of the objectives of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments is to allow investment firms 
authorised by the competent authorities of their home Member State and supervised by the 
same authorities to establish branches and provide services freely in other Member States. 
That Directive accordingly provides for the coordination of the rules governing the 
authorisation and pursuit of the business of investment firms.
(3) Directive 2004/39/EC does not, however, establish common standards for the own funds of 
investment firms nor indeed does it establish the amounts of the initial capital of such firms 
or a common framework
Scope of the 2006/48/EC Directive
Title I of the Directive deals with the subject matter, scope of the Directive and definitions found 
therein.
As well as certain institutions stipulated under the Directive,17 the Directive does not apply to the 
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central banks of member states and post office giro institutions.
Under paragraph 6 of the Preamble to the Directive, the term „credit institution“ is used to denote 
„all institutions whose business is to receive repayable funds from the public, whether in the form 
of deposits or in other forms such as the continuing issue of bonds and other comparable securities 
and to grant credits for their own account.“ Exceptions are to be provided for in the case of certain 
credit institutions to which the Directive cannot apply.18
Under paragraph 16 of preamble to the Directive, mutual recognition shall be extended to „financial 
institutions which are subsidiaries of credit institutions, provided that such subsidiaries are covered 
by the consolidated supervision of their parent undertakings and meet certain strict conditions.“
Paragraph 17 of the preamble goes on to state that „the host Member State should be able, in 
connection with the exercise of the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services, to 
require compliance with specific provisions of its own national laws or regulations on the part of 
institutions not authorised as credit institutions in their home Member States and with regard to 
activities not listed in Annex I provided that, on the one hand, such provisions are compatible with 
Community law and are intended to protect the general good and that, on the other hand, such 
institutions or such activities are not subject to equivalent rules under this legislation or regulations 
of their home Member States.“
Paragraph 58 states that  „In order to be effective, supervision on a consolidated basis should 
therefore be applied to all banking groups, including those the parent undertakings of which are not 
credit institutions. The competent authorities should hold the necessary legal instruments to be able 
to exercise such supervision.“
Title III Section 1 and Title III Section 2 of the Directive respectively define what activities are to 
be carried out by credit and financial institution, and how such activities are to be carried out.
Principles of Prudential Supervision 
According to Title V Chapter 1 of the Directive19, principles of prudential supervision include:20
- Competence of home and host member state
- Exchange of information and professional secrecy21
- Duty of persons responsible for legal control of annual and consolidated accounts
Informational disclosure will constitute the focus of study in this paper. 
In relation to disclosure requirements, Chapter 5 Article 14422 provides that:
                                               
18 According to paragraph 6  of the Directive, the provisions stated under the Directive „should not prejudice the 
application of national laws which provide for special supplementary authorisations permitting credit institutions to 
carry on specific activities or undertake specific kinds of operations.“
19 2006/48/EC
20   see page 22 of 200 of Directive <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:177:0001:0001:EN:PDF>
21 See  page 23 of 200 of Directive ibid
22 See under Section 2 „Disclosure by Competent Authorities“. Also see Chapter 5 Articles 145 –148 for “Disclosure 
Competent authorities shall disclose the following information:
(a) the texts of laws, regulations, administrative rules and general guidance adopted in their Member State in the field of 
prudential regulation;
(b) the manner of exercise of the options and discretions available in Community legislation;
(c) the general criteria and methodologies they use in the review and evaluation referred to in Article 124; and
(d) without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Chapter 1, Section 2, aggregate statistical data on key aspects of the 
implementation of the prudential framework in each Member State.
The disclosures provided for in the first sub paragraph shall be sufficient to enable a meaningful comparison of the 
approaches adopted by the competent authorities of the different Member States. The disclosures shall be published 
with a common format, and updated regularly. The disclosures shall be accessible at a single electronic location.”
The 2006/48/EC Directive expands on certain areas which were highlighted in the Post BCCI 
Directive. Such areas include activities subject to mutual recognition23 and authorisation for credit 
institutions.24
Further, whilst paragraph 7 of the Preamble to the Post BCCI Directive states: 
“Whereas the principles of mutual recognition and of home Member State supervision require that Member States' 
competent authorities should not grant or should withdraw authorization where factors such as the content of 
programmes of operations, the geographical distribution of the activities actually carried on indicate clearly that a 
financial undertaking has opted for the legal system of one Member State for the purpose of evading the stricter 
standards in force in another Member State within whose territory it carries on or intends to carry on the greater part of 
its activities.”
Paragraph 10 of the 2006/48/EC Directive expands on this, by adding that 
“Where there is no such clear indication, but the majority of the total assets of the entities in a banking group are located in 
another Member State the competent authorities of which are responsible for exercising supervision on a consolidated basis, in 
the context of Articles 125 and 126 responsibility for exercising supervision on a consolidated basis should be changed only 
with the agreement of those competent authorities.”
However, the scope covered by the 2006/48/EC Directive in relation to close links is quite limited. 
As the disclosure of close links is intended to help the regulator identify any possible related 
sources of risk, and owing to the fact the 2006/48/EC Directive is supposed to be “evolutionary,”25
it would have been expected that such evolutionary nature of the Directive would have taken into 
account the effects of increased conglomeration over the years, and the importance of systemic risk 
– particularly from unregulated (hedge funds) and non bank institutions. Prudential supervision 
appears to have dedicated overwhelming attention to capital adequacy requirements as a means of 
identifying risk – as reflected in the Directive.
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23   See page 23 of 200 of Directive <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:177:0001:0001:EN:PDF>
24   see Title II Articles 6 – 17
25 See paragraph 42 of the 2006/48/EC Directive
II.Systemic Risk
One definition of systemic risk which incorporates the concept of financial instability is provided in 
the ECB’s Financial Stability Review.26 Systemic risk is used to refer to “the risk that financial 
instability becomes so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point 
where economic growth and welfare suffer materially.”27 Three forms of systemic risk, which are 
not mutually exclusive, as identified in the review, include contagion risk, risk of macro shocks and 
the risk of imbalances that have been accumulated over time.28
It has been argued that even though regulation is required in order to ensure the workability of a 
market economy, “insight provides no necessary role for government intervention and that 
additional factors must be adduced to justify government intervention because markets evolve self-
regulatory mechanisms”29 The “too interconnected to fail”30 or “too big to fail” nature of financial 
institutions such as banks, the insurance industry and the securities markets”, a characteristic which 
in part is attributed to systemic risks, is evidential of the need for government or state intervention. 
Whether the greater extent of such regulatory functions should be entrusted to state regulators or 
conducted at federal level is a question which is assuming ever increasing importance, as illustrated 
by the recent financial crisis, and which is in need of redress – particularly in the US where a 
significant proportion of the regulation of the insurance industry has been carried out at state level 
since the 19thcentury.31
Whilst systemic risk related effects and corporate collapses in the US are attributed to its structure 
of financial regulation and the absence of a regulator at federal level for the insurance industry, the 
regulation of derivatives features prominently not only on the EU’s agenda, but also globally.
In their final report, the Financial Crisis Advisory Group highlight the fact that prudential regulators 
is used to denote banking and insurance regulators – as opposed to securities and other market 
regulators.32 This should not be interpreted to imply that systemic risks are only peculiar to the 
                                               
26 See “The Concept of Systemic Risk” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?a3fef6891f874a3bd40cd00aef38c64
f at page 134
27 ibid; Furthermore such systemic effects are considered to originate from “exogenous shocks” or endogenously
28 ibid
29 See GP O’Driscoll Jr and L Hoskins „The Case For Market Based Regulation” at page 471
30 These can generally be defined as “financial intermediaries like commercial banks which are engaged in 
activities whose failure poses a systemic risk or “externality” to the financial system as a whole. Such activities 
include the provision of loans, acceptance of deposits, investment bank activities related to money market funds, 
mutual funds, insurance firms and potentially even hedge funds and private equity funds.” V Acharya, J Biggs, M 
Richardson and S Ryan “On the Financial Regulation of Insurance Companies” 
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/salomon/docs/whitepaper.pdf at page 10 of 47
31 For more information on this, refer to V Acharya, J Biggs, M Richardson and S Ryan “On the Financial 
Regulation of Insurance Companies” http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/salomon/docs/whitepaper.pdf at page 8 of 47
32 See page 6 of the Final report. Furthermore they state that securities and other market regulators have “a direct 
role in enforcing the proper application of accounting standards by publicly traded entities and an oversight role 
banking and insurance sectors - as will be illustrated in latter sections of this paper. The ensuing 
section will focus on systemic risks generated by the insurance sector.
A) Contribution of the Insurance and Investment Sectors to Financial Stability
According to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review:33
“Insurance companies can be important for the stability of the financial system mainly because they 
are large investors in financial markets, because there are growing links between insurers and 
banks, and because insurers are safeguarding the financial stability of households and firms by 
insuring their risks.”
The role played by insurance policies and the insurance sector, in particular, in serving as a 
guarantee for credit risks and the fact that such guarantees triggered “huge losses and liquidity 
requirements” for mainly mono line insurers,34 when the value of the guaranteed assets witnessed a 
steep decrease, was highlighted by Acharya et al in their report on fundamental issues which 
insurance regulators are confronted with in the post (2007/09) financial crisis period.35 In their 
opinion, three principal forms whereby systemic risks can be generated by the insurance sector, 
include:36
Counter party risk: “If a financial institution is highly interconnected to many other financial 
institutions, then its failure could have a ripple effect throughout the system – for example 
OTC (over the counter) derivatives market. 
Spill over risks: This constitutes a second means whereby systemic risks could “filter” 
through the market. These occur “where one institution’s trouble triggers liquidity spirals –
resulting in decreased asset prices and the reluctance of lenders to provide funding which 
results in further price drops and funding illiquidity.”
“The third type of systemic risk arises from the fact that many financial institutions have 
fragile capital structures in that they hold assets with long duration or low liquidity but their 
liabilities are quite short term by nature. For example, the collapse of Lehman Brothers and 
the value of its short term debt resulted in a run on the entire financial system.
The systemic impact of the securities markets is also illustrated in the ECB’s report37 on credit 
swaps and counter party risk.38 As well as highlighting “the role played by credit default swaps 
(CDSs) in contributing to increased financial contagion”, the importance of counter party risk in 
                                                                                                                                                           
over the accounting standard setters themselves.”
33 See “The Importance of Insurance Companies for Financial Stability” December 2009 
<http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivefinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?3843b3ec94c7cbccf63a39de1092a
674> at page 160
34   Monoline insurers and the AIG were primarily affected
35 See Executive Summary, V Acharya, J Biggs, M Richardson and S Ryan “On the Financial Regulation of Insurance 
Companies” http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/salomon/docs/whitepaper.pdf at page 3 of 47
36 see ibid at pages 10 - 12
37 ‘Credit Defaults Swaps and Counter Party Risk’ ECB August 2009 
38 See particularly the executive summary of the report which highlights the contribution made by counter 
party risk in OTC markets; ibid.
over the counter markets is also emphasised.39
The importance the credit default swaps market and its associated risks were also highlighted in the 
European Commission’s staff report.40 One of the areas which the report indicates as being in need 
of consideration by regulators includes the necessity of increased disclosure and transparency in the 
evaluation of systemic risk.
B) Managing Systemic Risks
In order to manage systemic risk with greater efficiency, four areas are considered to require 
enhancements and these are as follows:41
- i) Extended disclosure on counter party risk, including indicators of counter party 
concentration exposure, would be useful both for individual institutions and for the market 
as a whole
- ii) Differences between the major data sources in terms of their data coverage and 
methodologies should be bridged to allow market participants and regulators to obtain and 
benefit from a broad and consistent market overview.
- iii) Improvements could also be made in terms of public disclosure. The most active 
institutions could regularly disclose their total gross notional amounts and gross market 
values for purchased and sold CDSs, as well as net values for uncollateralised derivative 
transactions.
- iv) Since information relating to CDS prices remains a challenge for non dealer market 
participants, increased transparency with regard to sales volumes for trades is desirable for 
both non-dealer market participants and regulators .
III. Advancements in the Aftermath of the 2007/09 Financial Crises
A. Improved European Supervisory Framework
The European Commission’s proposals of an improved European financial supervisory framework 
consist of two new pillars:42
- A European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC)
- And a European System of Financial Supervisors
On the 23 September 2009, the European Commission adopted draft legislation aimed at 
consolidating the supervision of the financial sector in Europe.43 Furthermore, the legislation will 
pave way for the creation of a new European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) (whose functions will 
consist of “the monitoring and assessment of potential threats to financial stability which arise from 
macro-economic developments”44) , a European System of Financial Supervisors and three new 
                                               
39 Ibid at page 4
40 See ‘Credit Defaults Swaps and Counter Party Risk’ ECB August 2009 at page 6. Also see ‚Ensuring Efficient, 
Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets.’ European Commission, COM (2009) 332, 3 July 2009
41 See ‘Credit Defaults Swaps and Counter Party Risk’ ECB August 2009 at page 6
42 “European Financial Supervision : A New Supervisory Framework for the EU” page 4 of 18
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication_may2009/C-
2009_715_en.pdf
43 See “Commission adopts Financial Supervision Proposals to Strengthen Financial Supervision in Europe” 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1347
44 See “European Financial Supervision : A New Supervisory Framework for the EU” page 4 of 18 < 
supervisory authorities consisting of a European Banking Authority (EBA), a European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and a European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA).45 Additional proposals aimed at strengthening financial supervision in Europe were 
adopted on the 26 October 2009.46 The additional legislative proposals are not only aimed at 
consolidating the earlier proposals which were adopted on the 23rd September, but also to “provide 
greater detail about precisely what powers are proposed for the new European Supervisory 
Authorities and in what areas”.47
B. Basel II's Response 
Basel II’s approach to credit derivatives exposures include the following :48 Banks are required to 
capitalise 3 major types of risks: Credit risk, market risk and counter party risk. The level of capital 
required to cover these risks is dependent on a number of factors which include whether the 
instrument is accounted for in the trading book, the banking book or whether it is a legal entity that 
is not subjected to national prudential regulation.
However, problems have been highlighted with Basel II’s approach to credit risk measurements -
problems which include extremely sensitive internal credit risk models. Furthermore, the inability 
of capital requirements on their own to address funding and liquidity problems constitutes one of 
the vital lessons drawn from the recent crisis. The impact of extremely sensitive credit risk models 
on pro cyclicality, and other measures which have the tendency to induce pro cyclical effects will be 
considered in the following section.
Pro cyclicality49
The promotion of financial stability through more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes 
one of Basel II’s primary objectives.50 However some problems identified with Basel II are 
attributed to pro cyclicality and to the fact that not all material credit risks in the trading book are 
adequately accounted for in the current capital requirements.51 The pro cyclical nature of Basel II 
has been criticised since “capital requirements for credit risk as a probability of default of an 
exposure decreases in the economic upswing and increases during the downturn”52 – hence 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication_may2009/C-
2009_715_en.pdf> Such functions which relate to the macro economic developments within the financial system as a 
whole are referred to as “macro supervision” for which the ESRC would “provide an early warning of system wide 
risks”. For further information on this and other functions of the ESRC, see ibid. 
45 The European System of Financial Supervisors will serve the purpose of facilitating trust between national 
supervisors. Such an aim will be promoted by “ensuring inter alia, that host supervisors have an appropriate say in 
setting policies relating to financial stability and consumer protection – hence allowing cross border risks to be 
addressed more  effectively.” See ibid
46 For further information on this, see “Commission Adopts Additional Legislative Proposals to Strengthen 
Financial Supervision in Europe” < http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1582>
47 ibid
48   See “General Capital Requirements to Cover Counter Party Risk Management Under Basel II” Credit Default 
Swaps and Counter Party Risk ECB at page 37
49 Pro cyclicality is the tendency for periods of financial/economic downturns or booms to be further 
exacerbated by certain economic policies.
50 For further objectives, see , Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and 
remuneration policies. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf > at page 22 of 47
51 See ibid at page 23 of 47
52 See Annex on Proc cyclicality, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and 
resulting in capital requirements which fluctuate over the cycle. Other identified53 consequential 
effects include the fact that fluctuations in such capital requirements may result in credit institutions 
raising their capital during periods when its is costly54 for them to implement such a rise – which 
has the potential of inducing banks to cut back on their lending. It is concluded that “risk sensitive 
capital requirements should have pro cyclical effects principally on undercapitalised banks.”55
Regulators will be able to manage systemic risks to the financial system during such periods when 
firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend where more market participants such as 
credit rating agencies, could be engaged in the supervisory process. The Annex to Pro cyclicality in 
the Accompanying Document amending the Capital Requirements Directive56 not only importantly 
emphasises the fact that regulatory capital requirements do not constitute the sole determinants of 
how much capital banks should hold, but also highlights the role of credit rating agencies in 
compelling banks to increase their capital levels even where such institution may be complying 
with regulatory requirements.
The association between systemic risks and liquidity risks and the rather apparent lack of due 
recognition accorded to liquidity risks under Basel II, constituted other reasons for the growing 
criticism of Basel II. 
Liquidity Risk
The definition of liquidity, as provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS),  is “the 
ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without 
incurring unacceptable losses. The fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of 
short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of 
an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.“57
In their report on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk”, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) noted that at the onset of the recent financial 
crises, the complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions, was to a 
large extent, attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected “on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches and excessive levels of leverage.”58 This has resulted in an “increasingly important role 
                                                                                                                                                           
remuneration policies. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> at page 46 of 47
53 As identified in the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. 
See page 46 of 47
54 Liquidity, a topic which will be addressed in the next section, is also considered to be “highly procyclical, 
growing in good times and drying up in times of stress.” During the build up to the present crisis, banks and other 
financial institutions had an incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity. See Report of the Financial Stability 
Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System “Measuring and Funding Liquidity Risk” at page 24 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
55 See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 at 
page 150
56 Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.< 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 46 of 47
57 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
58 Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk”  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
for liquidity provided by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.”59 Furthermore, the 
FSF highlighted the urgency of both authorities, namely, supervisors (in their monitoring of 
liquidity risks at banks) and central banks (in their design and implementation of market operations) 
collaborating in order to “ restore the functioning of interbank lending markets.”60
As identified in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, “the specific knowledge that banks possess 
about their borrowers make bank loans particularly illiquid.”61 The connection between liquidity 
and systemic risks is further highlighted in the Review where it elaborates on possible 
consequences resulting from a bank’s failure, namely:62 The “destruction” of such specific 
knowledge which banks have about their borrowers and the reduction of “the common pool of 
liquidity.”63 Such reduction in the common pool of liquidity may also trigger the failure of other 
banks – with the result that i) the value of such illiquid bank assets diminishes and ii) further 
problems within the banking systems are aggravated.64
“Endogenous risks” could also be generated depending on the type of information which the bank 
possesses about their borrowers and how the dissipation of such information to the public, if it has 
the potential to trigger a bank run, can be prevented.
According Greater Attention to Liquidity Risks
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper titled “Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the fact that many 
banks had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity risk management  
during periods of abundant liquidity.65
An extensive review of its 2000 “Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking 
Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel Committee as a means of addressing matters and 
issues arising from the financial markets and lessons from the Financial Crises.66
In order to consolidate on the  The BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision of September 2008, which should lead to improved management and supervision of 
liquidity risks of individual banks, supervisory bodies will be required “to develop tools and 
policies to address the procyclical behaviour of liquidity at the aggregate level”.67
                                               
59 ibid
60 „In order to counter the transfer of funding liquidity risk by systemically important financial institutions to the 
public sector“ ;ibid
61   “The Concept of Systemic Risk” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?a3fef6891f874a3bd40cd00aef38c64
f at page 137
62 ibid 
63 ibid
64 ibid
65 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
66 ibid
67 “The FSF proposes that the BCBS and CGFS develop a joint research effort to address funding and liquidity 
risk, starting in 2009. A key component of this research agenda is to define robust measures of funding and liquidity 
risk, which could assist assessments of liquidity risk by the private sector. Stress tests to gauge the probability and 
magnitude of a liquidity crisis in different market environments will be considered in this light.” For further information 
on this, see Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring 
and Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
In responding to the apparent gaps which exist with Basel II – as revealed by the recent crises, 
proposals which are aimed at imposing penalties for the occurrence of maturity mismatches68 have 
been put forward.69 The degree of disparity which exists between the maturity of assets and 
liabilities is crucial to determining the state of a company’s liquidity. Such penalties aimed at 
deterring the occurrence of maturity mismatches could include “higher capital requirements for 
banks which finance their assets with overnight borrowing from the money markets than banks 
which finance similar assets with term deposits.”70
The inability of bank capital, on its own, to address funding and liquidity problems has been 
acknowledged by many academics. As a result, further proposals, in addition to the above 
mentioned amendment to Basel II, have been put forward. These include the coupling of the 
existing regulatory framework with capital insurance or liquidity insurance mechanisms.71 Such 
proposals are aimed at “giving banks the right incentives ex ante and at improving the resilience of 
the financial system to shocks ex post.72 Furthermore, the ECB’s Financial Stability Review also 
highlights proposals which are aimed at supplementing Basel II regulation through the 
establishment of a mandatory liquidity insurance arrangement - whereby each bank has to pay the 
supervisor a liquidity charge.73
IV. Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II
According to a report,74 the two principal solutions which have been endorsed by the Turner 
Review and the DeLarosiere Report, and which are considered to have the potential to reduce pro 
cyclical effects75 induced by the CRD and Basel II, include: 1) The requirement that banks “hold 
bigger reserves during good times - hence limiting credit and risk expansion in good times and 
storing up capital to be used during bad times” (2) “Increasing risk-weighting on a range of assets 
because this also restricts balance sheet expansion”. 
Another proposal put forward as an optimal means of rectifying Basel II's procyclical effects – as 
illustrated through the “amplification of business cycle fluctuations”, involves the utilisation of a 
                                                                                                                                                           
68 A situation which could occur where an undertaking possesses more short term liabilities than short term asset. 
It could also occur where more assets are held (than liabilities) for medium and long term obligations.
69 See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
at page 148 and particularly Brunnermeier et al whose proposal includes the requirement of greater capital, “not 
only against the risk of assets, but also against the risk of funding such assets.”
70 Ibid at 148
71 Brunnermeier et al, Kashyap et al, and Perrotti and Suarez are all of the opinion that even though 
liquidity assistance to help banks cope with aggregate liquidity shocks is commendable, it would generate minimal 
benefits where such banks are not provided with the right incentives to reduce the probability of such shocks in the 
first place. For further information on this, see “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” 
Financial Stability Review December 2009 at page 149
72 ibid
73 ibid
74 The Turner Review :Key Elements of the Turner Review (page 2 of 4)§ <http://www.dlapiper.com>
75 Exacerbated strains on bank capital is the term used to denote procyclicality ; see ibid 
International Accounting Standards are also considered to have had a pro-cyclical impact. It is stated that “in 
particular moving to marking to market accounting, rather than the more traditional marking to maturity, 
exacerbated volatility in the accounts of banks – with valuation becoming practically impossible for some securities 
as the market in them disappeared.”;  ibid
“business cycle multiplier of the Basel II capital requirements that is increasing in the rate of growth 
of the GDP”. Under such a scheme, it is argued, riskier “banks would face higher capital 
requirements without regulation exacerbating credit bubbles and crunches.”76
Other mechanisms provided under the CRD as means of mitigating pro cyclicality within the capital 
requirements framework include:77
- The use of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates, PD estimates being based on 
long data series, technical adjustments made to the risk weight function, stress testing requirements 
and Pillar 2 supervisory review process. It is acknowledged, however, that more measures may be 
required to mitigate the procyclical effects of the capital requirements framework. Options provided 
include those aimed at reducing its cyclical risk sensitivity, measures which enhance its risk capture, 
and the intentional introduction of counter-cyclical buffers (comprising capital and/or 
provisions). 
Financial Stability Forum Recommendations Aimed at Mitigating Procyclicality 
In its report78 on “Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System”, the Financial Stability 
Forum’s recommendations to mitigate mechanisms that amplify procyclicality was extended to 
three areas:79
i) bank capital framework, ii) bank loan loss provisions as well as iii) leverage and valuation
issues. 
A summary of the recommendations relating to capital, as provided in the Report of the Financial 
Stability Forum is as follows:80
 That the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should strengthen the regulatory 
capital framework so that the quality and level of capital in the banking system increase 
during strong economic conditions and can be drawn down during periods of economic and 
financial stress;
 That the BCBS should revise the market risk framework of Basel II to reduce the reliance on 
cyclical VAR-based capital estimates;
 The BCBS should supplement the risk-based capital requirement with a simple, non-risk 
based measure to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system and put a floor 
under the Basel II framework;
 Supervisors should use the Basel Committee's enhanced stress testing practices as a critical
part of the Pillar 2 supervisory review process to validate the adequacy of banks’ capital
buffers above the minimum regulatory capital requirement;
                                               
76 R Repullo, J Saurina, and Carlos Trucharte, “How to Mitigate the Procyclical Effects of Capital Adequacy Rules” 
<http://www.eurointelligence.com/article.581+M5ff0e4ba595.0.html>
77 See the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf
Page 46 of 47
78 “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
79 Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf page 46 of 47
80 See “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” at pages 2 and 
3 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
That the BCBS should monitor the impact of the Basel II framework and make appropriate 
adjustments to dampen excessive cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements;
That the BCBS carry out regular assessments of the risk coverage of the capital framework 
in relation to financial developments and banks’ evolving risk profiles and make timely 
enhancements.
V. The Role of Market Participants in Assisting Supervisory Authorities in Better 
Management of Systemic Risk and other Supervisory Functions. 
The potential of market discipline to “reinforce capital regulation” and hence prudential 
supervision, and to “promote the safety and soundness of banks and financial systems” is 
acknowledged by Pillar 3 of Basel II.81
“Market discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound 
and efficient manner. It can also provide a bank with an incentive to maintain a strong capital base 
as a cushion against future losses arising from its risk exposures.”82
As highlighted by the Annex to Pro cyclicality in the Accompanying Document amending the 
Capital Requirements Directive,83 regulatory capital requirements do not constitute the sole 
determinants of how much capital banks should hold. Credit rating agencies also assume a vital role 
in compelling banks to increase their capital levels even where such institution may be complying 
with regulatory requirements.
The European Supervisory Authorities are to be given the responsibility for the authorisation and 
supervision of certain entities such as credit rating agencies and EU central counter party clearing 
houses, entities which have “pan-European reach”.84
“These responsibilities could include such powers as those of investigation, on-site inspections and 
supervisory decisions. These responsibilities would be defined in sectoral legislation (e.g., the 
Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies). Apart from reinforcing the effectiveness of supervision, this 
could enhance efficiency by creating a 'one-stop shop' for these supervised institutions. “85
Managing Credit and Counterparty Risks
Paragraphs 3-5 of Annex V86 to the 2006/48/EC Directive consist of stipulated criteria which should 
                                               
81 “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 22
82 ibid
83   Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. See page 46 of 47
84 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication_may2009/C-
2009_715_en.pdf  page 12 of 18
85 ibid
86 Technical Criteria Concerning the Organisation and Treatment of Risks
be followed and applied as means of managing credit and counter party risks more efficiently.
Paragraphs 3-5 provide that:
 3.Credit-granting shall be based on sound and well-defined criteria. The process for 
approving, amending, renewing, and re-financing credits shall be clearly established.
 4.The ongoing administration and monitoring of their various credit risk-bearing portfolios 
and exposures, including for identifying and managing problem credits and for making 
adequate value adjustments and provisions, shall be operated through effective systems.
 5.Diversification of credit portfolios shall be adequate given the credit .
VI. Link between Prudential Regulation and Financial Reporting: The Importance of 
Financial Disclosure
According to the Final Report of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group(FCAG), accounting standard 
setters fulfil their roles by facilitating the reporting of information related to the performance and 
financial condition of institutions - information which should be objective, transparent and 
applicable, whilst prudential regulators are concerned in the mitigation of risks arising from 
organisational failures and ensuring the “safety and soundness” of financial institutions.87 Despite 
these distinct functions, it is furthermore argued that both roles are similar in that they are 
committed towards the goals of promoting public interests, attaining financial stability and both are 
dependent on financial reporting in their decision making processes.88 The tendency of interests of 
financial market participants and prudential regulators to overlap, and the fact that prudential 
regulators are considered by the FCAG to be important users in financial reporting generates 
beneficial outcomes for the financial system since “ regular discussions are initiated between 
accounting standard setters and prudential regulators about potential changes to accounting 
standards.”89
However, financial reporting cannot be relied upon on its own. Even though its serves as a means 
whereby transparency of market information is facilitated, the information it provides is based 
solely on the business performance and condition of an entity for a limited duration of time.90
A. Widening the Scope of the Present Directives: According Greater Attention to Regulation in 
the Securities Markets
The ineffectiveness of market discipline to limit risk taking outside the banking sector, an 
underestimation of the systemic importance of some non banks institutions, and the fact that 
regulators (and supervisors) failed to take adequate account of the systemic risks presented by the 
interaction between regulated and unregulated institutions activities (such as hedge funds), and 
                                               
87 See Final Report of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group page 6
88 ibid
89 ibid at page 7 - “For example, prudential regulators could benefit from the insight of accounting standard setters in 
making regulatory requirements (such as the Basel ratios) more transparent.” See ibid
90 See Final Report of FCAG July 2009 at page 9 < 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&pagename=FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage&cid=11761
56365880>
markets constitute some vital lessons from the 2007/09 Financial Crisis.91 The unregulated hedge 
fund industry in particular, constitutes a source of major concern for many jurisdictions. The draft 
legislation adopted by the Commission in September 200992 will pave way for the creation of a 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). Whilst the Eurozone has responded to the 
need to facilitate measures aimed at fostering greater prudential supervision of the securities market, 
and whilst  the Turner Review signifies a turning point in the regulation of the hedge fund industry 
in the UK, the approach adopted by the European Commission to the regulation of the hedge fund 
industry, has been considered “mild” – given the fact that such an industry will be permitted greater 
access to European markets.93 This being the case even though the European Commission proposed 
a set of rules which require mandatory registration and disclosure of hedge fund activities to 
regulators.94 An obligation for EU managers of so-called “alternative investment funds” to register 
and disclose their activities, a measure which is aimed at enhancing supervision and avoiding 
systemic risks, constitutes the “principal regulatory component” of the proposed legislation.95
B. Credit Default Swaps96 and Counter Party Risk97
The European Central Bank’s report on “Credit Default Swaps and Counter Party Risk” identifies 
asymmetrical information as constituting a challenge for non-dealer market participants since in its 
view, price information is currently limited - as dealer prices are typically set on a bilateral basis 
and are not available to non-dealers.98 Furthermore, the report also identifies the role played by 
credit default swaps in the recent financial crises, highlights the contribution of counter risk 
management in the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brother, and also the challenges relating to 
the management of counter party risk exposures which arise from Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and 
other (“over the counter”)OTC derivatives.99
As was highlighted under the introductory section, the European Commission attributed a lack of 
transparency within the securities markets to the fact that many securities were traded “over the 
counter” (OTC).100 Further it stated that derivative traders and other market participants as well as 
authorities and supervisors were not aware of the derivative trading activities which were taking 
place and how “a complex web of mutual dependence between market operators was being created, 
how to disentangle such interdependent market, and how to manage markets in case which involved 
defaults and non payments by major derivative participants.”101
However some commentators are of an entirely different opinion as regards the need for greater 
transparency. Such commentators argue that increased transparency could actually impede proper 
functioning of the market – particularly where limited liquidity was available for a contract and 
                                               
91 See A Carvajal and others ‘The Perimenter of Financial Regulation’ (2009) SPN/09/07 at page 4 of 17
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0907.pdf >
92   See “Commission adopts Financial Supervision Proposals to Strengthen Financial Supervision in Europe” 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1347
93   See „McCreevy Spares Hedge funds From Tight Regulation“ 30 April 2009 http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-
services/mccreevy-spares-hedge-funds-tight-regulation/article-181867
94   ibid
95 ibid; Furthermore, the Commission adds that “such obligations within the proposed legislation are not to be applied 
to the funds themselves, but only to their managers – since the manager is responsible for key decisions”.
96 „Derivative instruments which enable market participants to transfer or redistribute credit risk.“ See Executive 
Summary of „Credit Default Swaps and Counter Party Risk“ European Central Bank 2009 at page 4
97 Risk that a counter party would default
98 „Credit Default Swaps and Counter Party Risk“ European Central Bank 2009 at page 62
99   ibid at page 36
100 See “An Oversight of Selected Financial Reforms on the EU Agenda: Towards a Progressive European Response” 
September 2009 at page 22 of 76.
101 ibid
where the disclosure of volume and price data could reveal a firm’s business strategies.102 It is 
however contended that greater transparency would enhance price and volume data – which would 
provide a better picture of the liquidity of a product and aid market participants in adjusting their 
positions and related capital or collateral.103 Furthermore, the ECB report highlights the CESR’s 
observations that most market participants would welcome increased transparency with regards to 
CDSs – as long as this would provide information on the volume of credit transfers (which would 
also generate liquidity).104
VII. Conclusion
A huge step towards greater extension of prudential supervision to the securities markets comprises 
greater information disclosure and hence, improved transparency. Progress in achieving such a goal 
is evidenced by the recent efforts of bodies such as the Financial Stability Board, the IASB and the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision105. Even though considerable progress has been achieved 
in areas relating to pro cyclicality and liquidity risks, particularly during the aftermath of the recent 
financial crisis, further work is required in the following areas:
- Increased transparency of information in relation to Credit Default Swaps
- More stringent measures aimed at regulating the hedge fund industry
- Disclosure requirements within the IASB accounting standards with respect to the main 
counterparts for derivative transactions - “added disclosures for large counter parties and 
those that exceed certain thresholds which would enable market participants to better assess 
their counter party risk and the potential for systemic spill over effects”. Such requirements 
as identified by the ECB, do not currently exist within the IASB framework.
- In its report on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk”, the Financial Stability Forum also highlights the need for supervisors to 
intensify efforts relating to the oversight of maturity and liquidity mismatches.106
Furthermore, the FSF highlights the need to undertake more intensive research in areas 
which involve the definition of maturity and liquidity mismatches at the systemic level –
owing to its more complex nature at such a level (this being attributed to the cross links 
between financial firms).107
As well as the need to give greater attention to disclosure requirements as a means of facilitating 
prudential supervision, more extensive involvement of market participants in the supervision 
process has the potential to contribute to the regulator's ability to manage systemic risks more 
efficiently – since  capital adequacy requirements do not constitute the sole determinants of capital 
levels to be retained by banks and since market participants such as credit agencies, whose 
                                               
102   „Credit Default Swaps and Counter Party Risk“ European Central Bank 2009 at page 85
103   ibid
104 The potential negative impact on liquidity has been emphasised by some market participants who are in favour of 
self regulatory initiatives, ibid.
105   See also “Enhancements to the Basel II Framework” July 2009 Bank of International Settlement Publications 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.htm and Revisions to the Basel II Market Risk Framework July 2009 Bank of 
International Settlements Publications  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.pdf
106   It also adds that where thresholds for indicators of such mismatches are breached, that supervisory checks should 
be carried out. See “Report on the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: 
Measuring and Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 23
107 In this respect, the FSF makes reference to Recommendation 3.2 which states that „ The BCBS and CGFS should 
launch a joint research program to measure funding and liquidity risk attached to maturity transformation, enabling 
the pricing of liquidity risk in the financial system.“ ;ibid
expectations and actions may compel banks to raise capital levels (even where such institutions are 
complying with regulatory requirements), also have a role to play in the supervisory process.
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